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Introduction 
Claire Cochrane and Jo Robinson 
 
Historians are, of course, not responsible for what actually happened. […] 
Historical responsibility for the past means that historians’ set of norms and 
values is a part of the past they interpret with them. In this respect the past is a 
moral predetermination of the intentions of present-day activities. It is an 
ethical legacy, already inbuilt in the cultural framework of topical life. 
Historians have to pick it up in order to become aware of the cultural 
constitution of themselves and their world (Rüsen 2004, 203-3). 
The essays collected in this volume look back from the world of the early twenty-first 
century — and from the USA and India as well as the constituent parts of the United 
Kingdom — to a variety of pasts, stretching from the late seventeenth century English 
Restoration period to the individual pasts still alive and painfully active in twenty-first 
century Northern Irish collective memory. All contributors, as individual historians 
and historiographers, question dominant narratives of theatre history. Some take on 
the responsibility of representing the histories of the living, while some show the way 
definitions of models of theatre and performance have broadened significantly in 
recent years. All grapple with the ethical issues raised by the concrete demands of 
specific histories; and in doing so, all seek to make clear the ways in which, in 
Rüsen’s terms, the creation of their histories is shaped by the ‘cultural constitution of 
themselves and their world’ (2004, 203).  
In her essay for this volume, ‘Mind the Gaps: Evidencing Performance and 
Performing Evidence in Performance Art History’, Heike Roms argues — by way of 
analogy with Stephen Bottoms’ critique of theatrical approaches that obscure their 
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own representational strategies behind truth claims derived from a supposed 
unmediated use of ‘real’ archival material — for the importance of historiographic 
methods that ‘have the potential to make the research effort transparent’ (Chapter 8). 
Such methods, she suggests, enable ‘others to experience and evaluate the conditions 
under which scholarly evidence is conceived and interpreted. All contributors to this 
collection similarly seek to make their research effort ‘visible’ to the reader: in the 
process, this volume highlights the importance of addressing the historiography of the 
histories we tell, and seeks to pay equal, critical attention to the key terms of ethics, 
evidence and truth in the representation of our different subjects.  
To represent means variously to stand for, to speak for, to fill the place of, or 
to embody another or others. To do this ethically in relation to past human lives 
demands, we would argue, painstaking attention not just to the historian’s 
methodologies but also to her or his individual aims and objectives. Nevertheless as a 
re-presentation of the past, the gap between the actuality of the historical moment and 
the attempt to speak for it again in the historian’s ensuing moment is fundamentally 
unbridgeable. To put it in human terms, we speak for the dead but we cannot speak to 
the dead and they cannot speak back to us. Even when the agents of the past are still 
available to bear live witness, such is the unreliability of memory and the instability 
of the mediating efficacy of interpersonal and intertextual exchange that the 
constructedeness of the historian’s representation remains obstinately 
incontrovertible. 
Such concerns are increasingly central to discussions of theatre history and 
historiography. In their introduction to Representing the Past: Essays in Performance 
Historiography Charlotte Canning and Thomas Postlewait explore the ‘foundational’ 
concept of representation as ‘a common concern’ unifying the work of the 
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contributors to their collection (2010, 7). They acknowledge, however, that ‘The 
historical representation seeks to be an objective image of the thing itself, yet it 
cannot avoid being in some capacity, a subjective distortion of that thing’. ‘The 
fundamental principle of historical enquiry’ is they affirm, the ‘attempt to represent 
the past truthfully’ but ‘whose truth, what truth, which truth?’ (2010, 11). Yet even 
when some kind of plausible resolution is reached about these questions, we would 
suggest that a further concern can be raised about the consequences of the truth, and 
of truth telling. To deploy the terminology of ethical philosophy, which we will 
explore in more detail in the following sections of this Introduction, the deontological 
obligation to tell the truth foregrounded by Postlewait and Canning as the 
fundamental duty of the historian may be countered and potentially reversed by the 
consequentialist appraisal of the extent and utility of the likely effects. This 
fundamental tension between an ethics of truth and an ethics of care lies at the heart of 
our approach to theatre historiography, and is central to the work of the contributors 
to this volume. 
  Published in 2010, Representing the Past builds on and serves as a companion 
volume to Interpreting the Theatrical Past, published in 1989 and co-edited by 
Thomas Postlewait with Bruce McConachie . The enhanced depth of enquiry and 
scope — not least in the greater international inclusiveness — of the later volume 
testifies to the current strength of disciplinary confidence. The exponents of theatre 
history no longer have to struggle, as R.W.Vince claimed in Interpreting the 
Theatrical Past, ‘for a sense of professional identity’. We are no longer uncertain ‘of 
defining our study as an independent branch of knowledge, of professing a kind of 
knowledge and a kind of truth intrinsically valuable’ (Vince 1989, 1). To be sure, as 
Rebecca Schneider has acknowledged in Theatre & History, some present-day 
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theatre-makers focused on the ‘nowness’ of live performance can and do reject theatre 
history as ‘an oxymoron’, a ‘time-suck’ (2014, 21). But the considerable body of 
recent historiographically-aware scholarship in a widening range of historical theatre 
and performance topics confirms, as David Wiles puts it, ‘that history matters’ and 
reinforces our shared desire ‘to resist ‘presentism’ which may be defined as a belief 
that the past is irrelevant because its inhabitants, people like us, are now irretrievably 
gone’ (Wiles and Dymkowski 2013, 3). 
Until now, however, there has been little attempt to address explicitly the 
historiographic challenges raised by ethical principles in theatre history. In general, as 
Mireia Aragay explains in her introduction to Ethical Speculations in Contemporary 
British Theatre, the academic field of theatre studies has been a latecomer to what has 
been dubbed the ‘ethical turn’ and which began to gather momentum in the 
humanities in the late 1980s (Aragay and Monforte 2014, 3). This absence is a glaring 
one, for in many ways theatre is an ideal site for ethical study. Writing in Ethics 
Theory and Practice Jacques Thiroux states that ‘the most important human moral 
issues arise for most ethicists when human beings come together in social groups and 
begin to conflict with one another […] most ethical systems meet in the social aspect’ 
(2007, 12). As an inherently social art form, produced in the necessary presence of an 
audience and through the collaborative activity and enabling capacity of others, 
theatre is thus, arguably, the art form which provides the ultimate forum for ethical 
debate: for thousands of years it has enacted stories framed by the moral codes which 
inform human behaviour and life choices, Contractarianism, the social contract 
tradition of ethics, which interrogates both the legitimacy of political authority and the 
moral norms established to maintain social cohesion, draws on dilemmas arising from 
individual self-interest (Shafer-Landau, 2013, 555) which have preoccupied 
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dramatists from Sophocles onwards: certainly the ‘uneasy interactions’ of 
participatory theatre and performance discussed by Helen Freshwater (2009, 62) and 
in Gareth White’s Audience Participation in Theatre: the Aesthetics of the Invitation 
(2013) highlight the particular potential of this bringing together of audience and 
performers in a shared and social space. 
Aragay identifies the key publications which have addressed the relationship 
between theatre and ethics since the publication of Nicolas Ridout’s Theatre & Ethics 
in 2009 (Aragay and Monforte 2014, 3).i Ridout’s concise guide is particularly 
pertinent to our collection because it is grounded in history and chronologically 
structured, arguing that ‘ the ethical dimensions of theatrical production and 
spectatorship cannot be separated from the specific historical circumstances in which 
they take place’ (2009, 7). Ridout thus emphasises that as a branch of human 
knowledge and understanding, ethics itself has a history. One major historiographic 
task is to discuss the extent to which the ethical codes and authorities of the past 
continue to inform the present.  
 In an attempt to begin to fill that gap, the essays here thus seek to explore the 
ways in which theatre historians apply ethical thinking to the truthful representation, 
recovery, or re-visioning of the different ways and means by which theatre makers in 
the past have enacted stories or scenarios related to human experience, and in doing 
so to be alert to the fact, highlighted by both Ridout and Rüsen that the ethical codes 
and authorities of the past continue to shape the ‘cultural constitution of themselves 
and their world’ (Rüsen 2004, 203). We would argue —albeit fully aware that this 
assertion has been much contested by postmodern historiography — that the primary 
ethical obligation of the historian is to try to tell the truth, however difficult this may 
be; the probity of the evidence which is adduced in support of historical truth claims 
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is thus of equally primary importance. Hence, therefore, the dual focus of these essays 
is on ethics and evidence. But none of the concepts and strategies which will be 
explored are easy — not least the question of what we mean by the truth. There are no 
clear-cut answers, although we hope these essays will produce fresh perspectives, 
broadened horizons and new knowledge. 
Basic facts about the identity, objectives and circumstances of theatre makers 
and their audiences can seem obvious and even (sometimes) easily-confirmed. But as 
Rosemarie K. Bank makes clear in Chapter 4 of this volume in her essay on ‘Ethics 
and Bias’, such facts are not immutable and separate from explanations of them. What 
historians think they know about the past, even the recent past, may not — often does 
not — necessarily correspond with the ‘knowledge’ of those who lived that past. Our 
knowledge of where performances happened, how, and within what kind of material 
conditions is constantly being adjusted in the light of fresh evidence, or perhaps more 
crucially, through the process of the reappraisal of existing evidence. And of course, 
what may be defined as ‘theatre’ has been challenged many times over by proponents 
of performance studies and, increasingly, within the field of applied theatre practice. 
Admitting to uncertainty is an ethical act in itself. 
 
Beginning with ethics 
In answering the question ‘what is ethics?’ the explanation offered by the moral 
philosopher Peter Singer acknowledges a degree of ambiguity even around a 
definition: ‘The word itself is sometimes used to refer to the set of rules, principles, or 
ways of thinking that guide, or claim authority to guide, the actions of a particular 
group; and sometimes it stands for the systematic study of reasoning about how we 
ought to act’ (1994, 4). If we look to the first meaning should we, as a group of 
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twenty-first century professional historians, try to formulate a set of authoritative 
guidelines which direct how we should approach our work: an ethic of theatre 
history? Or if we move into the deeper waters of moral philosophy where ‘moral’ 
pertains to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ principles or habits of living — how we ought to act — are 
we openly inviting obfuscation in the practice of history as the representation of the 
past? As becomes rapidly obvious the systematic study of ethics as a branch of 
knowledge concerned with human conduct raises many more questions than it 
answers. In his preface to the 2013 edition of his monumental anthology of ethical 
theory, Russ Shafer-Landau highlights obligatory areas for inclusion: 
consequentialism, deontology, contractarianism and virtue ethics — and then adds in 
‘separate sections on moral standing, moral responsibility, moral knowledge’ before 
concluding with examples of work which question whether systematic ethical theory 
is even possible. All address, but in radically different ways, two questions ‘at the 
heart of ethics: (1) What should I do? , and (2) What sort of person should I be?’ 
(2013, xi). In saying that we cannot ‘plausibly’ answer one without making some sort 
of commitment to answering the other, Shafer-Landau asks also ‘whether such 
answers are in some way reflective only of personal opinion, or whether they might 
be best measured against some more objective standard’ (2013, xi). This last is a 
question that is of particular relevance for the contributors to our collection as they 
consider, and articulate, their own position in their task of representing the past. 
Despite the fact that many of most influential ethical systems of the past 
derived from explicit alignment with, or reaction against the doctrines of the major 
world religions, Peter Singer is at pains to point out that ethics has no necessary (our 
emphasis) connection with religious belief. As he puts it ‘we can understand ethics as 
a natural phenomenon that arises in the course of the evolution of social, intelligent, 
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long-lived mammals who possess the capacity to recognise each other and to 
remember the past behaviour of others’ (1994, 5): in Ridout’s terms, it has a history. 
Untied from fixed positions or religious certainties, ethics can thus be questioned and 
challenged.  
The collapse of confidence in Enlightenment faith in rationality and steady 
progress has at its most extreme provoked what the historiography Keith Jenkins has 
described as ‘postmodernism’s celebration of the moral “undecidability” of a 
decision’ which signals not just the end of traditional ethics but also of history (1999, 
1). In a response published in her book Historical Theory, Mary Fulbrook sets herself 
to oppose not just this nihilist perspective, but also (again put at its most extreme) the 
proposition that ‘any [historical] narrative is merely a fictive construct imposed 
almost arbitrarily at the whim and fancy of the historian’. Fulbrook asserts firmly that 
the aim to say ‘something true (however limited, temporary, inadequate) about a real 
past (however essentially unknowable in any totalizing sense)’ is still worth holding 
on to ‘even in the wake of the postmodernist challenge’ (2002, ix). The essays 
collected together in this volume are predicated on the understanding that telling 
‘something true’ about the past is an ethical responsibility. 
 
Pleasing Ourselves 
While we do not doubt the centrality of ethical dilemmas to theatre as a medium 
concerned with enactments of human behaviour, it is worth asking about the extent to 
which the history of theatre has characteristics which distinguish it as a discipline 
from other branches of historical scholarship and thus bring wider — or different — 
ethical challenges. As David Wiles points out, most theatre historians practise their 
profession because of an emotional attachment: ‘I love the theatre and I love thinking 
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about what I love’. ‘As creative beings’, he argues, ‘they imagine how they would 
love theatre better, or even better, if it were different, and at least in some respects 
more like the way it once was’ (2013, 5). This suggestion that historians recover and 
represent the theatre of the past as a kind of exemplary exercise conducted for the 
edification of the present is highly debatable, although of course the provision of 
human exempla in historical writing taken from the heroic deeds or misdeeds of the 
past was classically a way of acquiring virtus for the reader. But that theatre historians 
in thrall to the emotional intensity generated by ‘great’ performances of past 
experience seek to recall that momentary glamour in order to recapture, pin down and 
account for it in terms of past audiences’s aesthetic pleasure or indeed their own is 
certainly the case. The selection of key individuals, institutions and events for 
inclusion in the histories which have formed traditionally-accepted historical canons 
or master narratives of theatre have been inextricably linked to the value judgements 
of individual historians. The typically combative argument which Jenkins has made, 
that as a ‘contested discourse […] people(s), classes and groups autobiographically 
construct interpretations of the past literally to please themselves’ (1991, 19), 
resonates particularly strongly where the subject of historical analysis is cultural 
practice predicated on the delivery of pleasure, however broadly that is defined and 
whatever the values associated with that.  
Debates about value are fundamental to ethical enquiry, whether it be the core 
meta-ethical question of what human beings consider to be of ultimate value, or the 
normative ethics which are deployed in the interests of establishing rules, standards or 
principles to guide what we do in a specific field of activity. Value as a concept also 
opens up meta-ethical questions about relativism and the status of human values 
within the systems of morality that each society constructs. If, as Russ Shafer-Landau 
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puts it, ‘the central meta-ethical question is whether moral views can be true, and, if 
so, whether they can be objectively true’ (2013, 10), then the objectivity of the values 
underpinned or produced by those moral views becomes part of that central question. 
When the object of enquiry is art, the value placed on the process and production of 
art — which, within the academy especially, may be formed by aesthetic or 
ideological preferences — can determine the value which is placed on the histories 
which are written and the writers of those histories. 
‘Good’ or successful art can enable the success of ‘good’ historians whose 
expertise is further validated by the association with the public — popular or coterie 
— acclaim accorded to that art. This has implications for professional success and 
indeed for the economic success of the historical product as commodity. ‘ Good’ quite 
clearly here is a relative value and raises questions about why some theatre-makers or 
models of theatre are deemed of greater importance or value than others and thus 
worthier of the historian’s attention. What were and are the criteria for what is 
thought to be effective theatre and how they influence the historian’s interest needs to 
be considered. If, at the historical moment of performance, the product was deemed to 
be ineffective or unsuccessful, why did that happen, and if the passage of time has 
brought about altered perspectives on that perception of effectiveness, how should the 
historian mediate truthfully between the values of the past and what came later to 
influence the present? 
  To use an obvious example, the priority given to the avant-garde within 
academic theatre studies since the Second World War has led to the recognition of the 
conceptual importance of formerly marginalised experiments and individuals who 
were disparaged and dismissed in their own time. However as Mireia Aragay has 
pointed out a consequence of this is that an increasingly dominant discourse has seen 
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formal innovation or experimentation become ‘the cornerstone for the spectator’s 
ethical engagement […] capable of engaging audiences “emotionally, viscerally and 
intellectually”’ (Aragay and Monforte 2014, 6). To assume that audiences for 
intellectually undemanding popular performance are not capable of experiencing what 
Jill Dolan has called ‘utopian performatives’ (2005, 5) in their experience of shared 
pleasure, is exclusionary and thus ethically questionable. Jacky Bratton has argued 
forcefully that the battles waged by the modernist radicals in the nineteenth century to 
raise the intellectual level of drama on the British stage created a grand narrative of 
British theatre which effectively obliterated the strength of the popular experience 
from the historical record (2003, 12-13). Indeed the recent growth of studies of 
popular, mass pleasure-giving theatre such as commercial theatre, variety theatre and 
pantomime and amateur theatre is undoubtedly the result of academic historians 
recognising and questioning their own criteria of value: not least because in 
attempting to construct a fuller, more equitable representation of the past, something 
arguably much more fundamental is being tested in disciplinary practice.  
 
The Good Historian and Epistemic Virtue 
What is a good historian? What makes a good historian, where good means proficient, 
may also make her or him good in the ethical sense where good means moral 
goodness. At the same time, however, and this is where the difficulty begins, practical 
expertise may not automatically signify good character. This is a distinction which 
arises in Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics, thoughts on the virtuous life articulated 
in the fourth century BCE, which remain some of the most influential foundational 
texts in western philosophy. As the contemporary philosopher Jonathan Barnes has 
recently pointed out in his commentary on The Ethics, ‘ta ēthica’, which Aristotle 
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refers to, ‘transliterates to ‘The Ethics’ but translates rather as ‘Matters to do with 
Character’ (2004, xxv, emphases ours): a definition taken up by David Roberts at the 
outset of his essay on theatrical biography and the case of Thomas Betterton in 
Chapter 2 of this volume. Aristotle’s primary focus is on the ideal human being: 
matters to do with character are concerned with the virtuous qualities and actions 
which make good men. Furthermore the text as it has been transmitted through time 
begins with the famous statement ‘Every art and every investigation, and similarly 
every action and pursuit is considered to aim at some good. Hence the good has been 
rightly defined as “that at which all things aim”’ (Aristotle 2004, 3). Viewed in 
Aristotelian terms, then, the deliberate action of the ‘good’ theatre maker or theatre 
historian should be the attainment of some good. Of course in the Poetics Aristotle 
explores the qualities which make dramatic poetry and action good, elevating poetry 
above history because of the imaginative ideals which art can express and in the 
process almost certainly ‘answering’ Plato’s suspicion of its power to corrupt (1965, 
43-4). However, as Barnes acknowledges, what may be inferred from Aristotle’s use 
of the term ‘good’ remains slippery and potentially morally ambiguous. Ultimately, 
Barnes suggests, it might be more realistic to conclude that Aristotle’s main aim is to 
produce successful human beings with the expertise to live worthwhile lives (2004, 
xxvi-xxviii). 
However an argument put forward recently by the historiographer Herman 
Paul in his essay ‘Performing History: How Historical Scholarship is Shaped by 
Epistemic Virtues’ (2011) makes a case for the ways in which the epistemic virtues 
necessary for the practice of ‘good history’ are indicative of the good character of the 
historian. Thus far our discussion of the values represented in theatre history has 
focused on their relationship with aesthetic experience. In contrast, Paul concentrates 
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on the ascetic qualities necessary for the discipline — as in control and training as 
well as the subject area — of history (2011, 5). In so doing he is also indirectly 
alluding to the normative ethics, the rules and principles which guide historical 
scholarship. As he acknowledges, insistence on diligence, patience, accuracy and 
honesty and so on was central to the ‘scientific ‘ method of painstaking research 
pioneered by the positivist historians of the late nineteenth century. Even now that we 
know, as indeed Leopold von Ranke knew as far back as 1887 (Bentley 1999, 39), 
that complete knowledge of what ‘really’ happened in the past is not possible, 
essentially the core rules of enquiry have not changed. In The Cambridge Introduction 
to Theatre Historiography Thomas Postlewait reinforces epistemic principles by 
challenging the weak evidential basis of commonly-held assumptions about key 
historical phenomena and events in theatre and in so doing offers a model for the 
character of the ‘good’ historian: 
All historians, in the process of reconstructing past events, need to determine 
the authenticity of sources and the reliability of eyewitnesses. In turn, they 
must transform the artefacts into facts, develop supporting evidence for their 
hypotheses, place historical events in appropriate contexts, confront their own 
organising assumptions and categorical ideas and construct arguments based 
upon principles of possibility and plausibility (2009, 1). 
Herman Paul, however, citing the recent ‘performative turn’ in the philosophy and 
history of science, quotes Elin Diamond’s statement that ‘performance is always a 
doing and a thing done’ and suggests a shift of the historiographic focus away from 
the product of historical scholarship to the process or ‘doings’ (Paul 2011, 4; 
Diamond 1996,1). The character of the historian, her or his commitment to epistemic 
virtues and thus to the ethics of scholarship becomes more dynamic, more open to 
14 
 
reflexivity and scrutiny. Importantly it permits the entry of ‘the self’ of the historian 
and ensures that as Paul puts it, that ‘epistemic virtues […] are not etched in stone’ 
(2011, 1); that individual choices can be made and seen to be made. ‘Without 
“scholarly selves,”’ Paul states, ‘socialized into knowledge-seeking communities and 
disciplined to perform according to the standards set by those communities, 
scholarship is impossible’ (2011, 9).  
Paul’s visualization of the lived experience of scholarship, ‘how historians 
with wrinkled eyebrows pondered causes and effects, or how at night in bed they 
stared at the ceiling contemplating the relative merits of alternative explanatory 
strategies […] bending over ancient documents carefully removed from gray folders 
in brown archival boxes’ (2011, 3), provokes a wry smile of recognition. But in 
considering ‘vices’ as well as ‘virtues’, his discussion encompasses other wider 
disciplinary, professional and indeed institutional issues. We have already noted the 
ways in which selective disciplinary values confirm professional success and that of 
course extends to the symbiotic relationship between academic publishers struggling 
with ever increasing commercial pressures and the competitive priorities of the 
academy. The virtue of the knowledge seeking community can become the vice of the 
hermetically-sealed enclave where scholars simply talk to, and work, for each other. 
As Paul also makes clear in a subsequent response to a critique of his thesis (Paul, 
2012), even a process-driven focus on epistemic virtues must not become reductionist. 
To achieve Aristotle’s phronesis (Aristotle, 2004, 144-5), that is ‘practical wisdom’ in 
seeking knowledge and understanding of the past, virtue epistemology and virtue 
ethics must function in synergy. 
 
Historical Responsibility 
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A key ethical question is whose interests are being served in achieving knowledge of 
the past? Within the field of normative or prescriptive ethics, where on the spectrum 
of human behaviour between self-interest (egoism), the interests of others (altruism) 
or the interests of all concerned (utilitarianism) should the good historian be 
positioned in the negotiations between the living and the dead or indeed between the 
living and the living? What happens to the community of scholars when historical 
authority is questioned? As the German contemporary philosopher Jörn Rüsen puts it 
in an essay on ‘Responsibility and Irresponsibility in Historical Studies’, ‘it belongs to 
the historian’s responsibility to reveal not only those features of the past which fit into 
the self-esteem of contemporaries, but also to reveal those hidden but effective 
disturbances in their self-esteem’ (2004, 199). What is the ultimate goal of the 
individual historian engaged in the process of disturbing the self-esteem of 
contemporaries? At what point does the scholarly search for knowledge become the 
pursuit of power through knowledge — the authority of present scholarship 
effectively assuming ownership of the past as well as power over the present? 
Rüsen’s essay was the product of a knowledge-seeking community of scholars 
who met for an international conference on the ethics of history in Atlanta, Georgia in 
1998 for what was subsequently described as ‘a rare occasion of insightful reflection, 
eloquence, and respectful and valuable exchange of ideas’. None of the contributors, 
including the three we are quoting more fully in our introduction (Rüsen, Edith 
Wyschogrod and Allan Megill), were prepared to settle for ‘an epistemic anarchism’ 
and all reinforced ‘the need to respect the role of the subject in history, both as 
historian and as historical agent’ (Carr, Flynn and Makkreel 2004, viii-ix). 
In ‘Representation, Narrative and the Historian’s Promise’ Edith Wyschogrod 
returned to the ancient differentiation between the philosopher and the historian and 
16 
 
the emotional investment which the historian brings to her subject as an ethical 
imperative: 
the historian’s calling is not that of the philosopher who […] effects the 
becoming of thought through the mediation of a concept. The historian does 
not pluck the subjects of her narrative from a prior conceptual tradition, but 
rather is a passageway for the emergence of an always already partly 
configured past […] the historian’s account is not the outcome of an inert and 
lifeless relation to the past, but is rather the result of a double passion: an eros 
for the past and an ardour for the others in whose name there is a felt urgency 
to speak. To convey that-which-was in the light of these passions is to become 
a historian (2004, 28). 
As a Jewish philosopher of religion, Wyschogrod’s felt urgency was to speak on 
behalf of the dead whose process of dying had brought unimaginable suffering. 
Contemplating this is apt to provoke the feelings of inferiority which tend to go with 
the territory of art-form history – are we as theatre historians ‘real’ historians? To be 
sure theatre in all its forms represents death and suffering, but on the whole as 
historians we do not normally expect to be researching the death and suffering of its 
exponents, even though theatre has taken place as a means of ameliorating appalling 
conditions, including in the death camps of the Holocaust. But the quotidian brings its 
own kinds of lived experience which should be acknowledged, and theatre is most 
certainly about passion — a fact which both Plato and Aristotle recognised. As Claire 
Cochrane’s essay in our collection explores, theatre history, like any history of human 
endeavour, is a record of failure as well as success. When the hopes and dreams fail, 
suffering results. To paraphrase Wyschogrod we cannot wipe away the tears but we 
can at least remember that they were shed and why. 
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At the same time, the historiographer Allan Megill expressed unease about an 
ethic of passionate engagement which assumes ‘the patient work of historians’: 
If one is to claim to make the voices of the past speak, there needs to be 
adequate reason for thinking that the voices have been rightly constituted. 
Otherwise, they might be merely the product of the historian’s own 
compelling desire — whether the practical desire for such and such a 
supposedly beneficial political or moral outcome in the present, or the 
aesthetic desire for representations that are dramatic or edifying or horrible 
(2004, 50). 
The ‘ethics of history-writing resides above all in the moment of resistance to 
historiographical wish fulfilment. This moment of resistance’ is for Megill ‘an 
epistemological moment’ (2004, 50).  
Rüsen’s three temporally-determined dimensions of responsibility potentially 
bring together both ardour and resistance. Firstly historians are responsible to their 
contemporaries, that is, those who share their own time, for ‘the specific needs of 
orientation […] Historical memory has to contribute to the validation and legitimation 
of the life order of today [… and] is responsible for identity, i.e. a balanced 
connection between the experience of the past and the expectations of the future in the 
relationships that persons and groups have among themselves and to others’ (2004, 
197-8). That responsibility, however, also includes the requirement to challenge 
settled perceptions of identity, offering new and potentially disruptive perspectives 
that not only have the capacity to change the present but also by extension shift into 
‘the future-relatedness’ of historical thinking which is Rüsen’s second dimension of 
responsibility. 
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Historical responsibility for the future perspective of human life is guided by a 
value system of hopes and threats. A commitment to these values allows the 
historical work its practical function to disclose abilities and chances for 
activities by its representation of the past. It might miss this achievement if it 
fails to address its interpretation of historical experiences to the spontaneity of 
human activity, i.e., to the mental point where actions get their intentional 
direction. Then every element of ethical commitment would be cast off the 
future perspective (2004, 200). 
If, Rüsen argues, the irresponsible historian presents the past as ‘a closed 
predestination of the future’, then ‘past and future are welded together in an unbroken 
chain of time, with no place for value-generated transformations or critical refutations 
of predetermined developments’ (200). 
The final dimension of responsibility is of course to the past itself. At its most 
profound it represents an ethical duty to the suffering of the dead, albeit in the 
knowledge that their pain and tears cannot ever be wiped away. Paying attention to 
what those who lived before us experienced is a way of doing justice, offering 
explanations and warnings, and of ensuring that the dead are not forgotten. It also 
respects and acknowledges the ‘value-generated transformations’ of past agents from 
which we have benefitted and just as importantly examines cultural practices which 
no longer correspond to the value systems of the present. Reflective and reflexive 
awareness of this responsibility prompts the understanding that the past histories on 
which we draw reflect the ethical values and moral and religious systems of the past 
in which they were written. As R.G.Collingwood pointed out as he wrote An 
Autobiography in the midst of the ethical dilemmas about human conduct provoked 
by the Second World War: ‘ideals of personal conduct are just as impermanent as 
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ideas of social organisation. Not only that, but what is meant by calling them ideals is 
subject to the same change’ (1944, 47). However as Rüsen argues, a historicist 
approach which considers ‘that the people of the past can only be evaluated according 
to their own value system’ is problematic:  
there must be something in between the normative horizon and value system 
of the past and the present which mediates them in a way that justice to the 
dead is possible by taking their values into account as well as the values of the 
historians’ time and life order’(2004, 203). 
But it is also important to recognise that history is written about the living as well as 
the dead; it is arguably here that issues of value and objectivity in relation to truth 
become most ethically pressing. Even when writing about the very recent past as 
several of the contributors to this collection are doing, the historian can be confronted 
with the need to mediate between different value systems and moreover in measuring 
herself against the foundational ethical questions — ‘what sort of person should I be?’ 
and ‘what should I do?’ — be compelled to decide what kind of historian acts in the 
way she chooses to do. In enquiring into the lives of her chosen ‘others’ in search of 
truth/s which might throw light on the processes of theatre creation, or on the 
structures which underpin and enable that art, how far should that enquiry go and 
what, if any, constraints should be placed on the capacity to inflict the pain which 
may result? 
 
The Other 
Wyschogrod’s insistence on the ‘ardour for the others in whose name there is a felt 
urgency to speak’ was as, we have already made clear, a response to the trauma of 
twentieth century ‘man-made mass death’ (Megill 2004, 47). The influence of the 
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Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas resonates strongly through her work as it does 
through the whole of The Ethics of History and has become increasingly dominant in 
critical thinking about the ethical component of contemporary theatre practice. Mireia 
Aragay explains, quoting Ridout on ‘an attempt to begin the work of philosophy all 
over again’ (Ridout, 2009, 52), that Levinas’s project ‘lies at the basis of the 
emergence of a poststructuralist relational ethics which, rather than articulating a set 
of predetermined codes and rules of conduct, grounds itself in the very experience or 
event of being open to the absolute, irreducible alterity of the Other’. Jacques Derrida, 
who maintained a close textual and personal relationship with Levinas until the 
latter’s death in 1995, compared the movement of Levinas’s thinking to the crashing 
of a wave on a beach, always the same wave returning and repeating its movement 
with deeper insistence (Critchley 2014, 4). 
As Ridout points out, the initial appeal of Levinas for theatre scholars lies in 
his concept of the encounter with the face (Ridout 2009, 51-3). Most obviously in 
theatre face-to-face communication is fundamental to the physical interaction between 
actor and audience. Writing as an individual whose family was almost completely 
wiped out by the Holocaust, for Levinas ‘the concept of totality which dominates 
Western philosophy’ — which in the reality of war became the horror of political 
totalitarianism — must be replaced in his absolute ethics with an obligation towards 
the other represented by the idea of the face ‘unavoidably’ and infinitely present even 
before self-consciousness begins. 
Our relation with him [sic] certainly consists in wanting to understand him, but 
this relation exceeds the confines of understanding. Not only because, besides 
curiosity, knowledge of the other also demands sympathy or love, ways of 
being that are different from impassive contemplation, but also because in our 
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relation to the other, the latter does not affect us by means of a concept. The 
other is a being and counts as such (Levinas, 2006, 5). 
However, as Seán Hand explains, Levinas’s face is not to be thought of in specifically 
biological, ethnic or social terms (Hand 2009, 42) and, as Ridout acknowledges it is 
dangerous to appropriate Levinas’s philosophy too easily in the interests of theatre 
(Ridout 2009, 55). Having witnessed the cowardice and evasion of artists in the midst 
of the reality of the Holocaust, Levinas, in an echo of Plato, mistrusted art’s ‘phantom 
essence’ although he frequently quoted Shakespeare to illustrate his thinking (Hand, 
2009, 63-4). But nevertheless the statement ‘The other is a being and counts as such’ 
has proved to be a powerful motif for our intentions in assembling our collection of 
essays. Levinas’s idea ‘that ethics is first philosophy, where ethics is understood as a 
relation of infinite responsibility to the other person’, means that the other (autrui ) is 
not reducible to an idea , a concept, or to a simple relation of sameness or difference 
to ourselves (Critchley, 2006, 6). 
 As historians, our work requires an understanding that in addressing the past 
we are dealing with someone else’s present and that in telling stories of the past we 
are modifying our own stories, practices and relationships with the present. But in 
both these tensioned relationships an engagement with Levinas’s idea of the other 
prompts us to an understanding that the issue of ethics, of responsibility to the 
material relics or traces of theatre history, seems vital. The authority of the historian 
predicated on ‘being’ in terms of personal self-fulfilment has to give way to an/other 
more pressing authority. As Rüsen puts it: ‘Saying that people are responsible for 
what they do or don’t do implies an authority to which they feel responsible or which 
makes them responsible or claims their responsibility’ (2004, 195). Moreover in the 
light of our discussion of value above, it is salutary to note Levinas’s statement that 
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‘Moral consciousness is not an experience of values ‘but an access to exterior being’ 
(Levinas 1976, 409, quoted in Critchley 2009, 4). 
 
Virtue Ethics and Feminist Epistemology 
 In part another reaction to the manifest failure of more than two thousand years of 
philosophical thinking about ethics to prevent the unprecedented levels of human-
inflicted suffering experienced in the twentieth century, a renewed interest in 
Aristotle’s preoccupation with what makes an individual human being innately good 
and virtuous — and thus capable of good and virtuous acts — has surfaced in the 
comparatively new field of virtue ethics. Following arguments in favour of giving 
greater priority to emotional understanding and moral psychology put forward by the 
philosopher Elisabeth Anscombe in the late 1950s, a growing number of 
contemporary ethical thinkers including Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum 
have entered a debate about individual responsibility considered in the light of actual 
concrete human experience. For what Nussbaum terms ‘general algorithms and 
abstract rules’, such as Kantian universal principles or utilitarianism which developed 
out of the Enlightenment confidence in ‘courageous reasoning’ to find ways of 
regulating human conduct, have proved impossible to apply consistently to the human 
propensity for wrong-doing (Nussbaum 2013, 630-1). What is relevant here for the 
writing of theatre history is not just the reinforced incentive to engage with the 
specific and concrete, but also the opportunities for fresh perspectives drawn from 
feminist epistemology and extrapolation of virtue ethics. 
When Aristotle contemplated the good man it is difficult to avoid the fact that 
‘man’ in his parlance was most certainly gender specific, not a generic term for 
human beings as a whole. In his historical moment, teaching in the Lyceum in fourth 
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century Athens, he was speaking to and for an elite group of young men educated in 
the strict hierarchy of Athenian society which not only kept slaves, but also 
subordinated women. Aristotelian commentary — variously asserting that women 
were either physically or morally defective — contributed in no small way to the 
intellectual legitimacy of centuries of female subjugation and marginalisation. Indeed 
it would take the nineteenth century proponents of universally-applied courageous 
reasoning such as John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, as exemplified by their 
collaborative 1869 essay The Subjection of Women, to add rational intellectual weight 
to the painfully slow process of demanding equal rights for women. However, that 
feminist ethics, drawing on the political radicalism integral to Second Wave feminism 
of the 1960s and 70s, could be considered an offshoot of virtue ethics is an interesting 
example of the way the belief in the fundamental importance of the ancient belief in 
human ‘flourishing’ and right to be eudaimōn (happy) has retained its ethical 
resonance in the face of postmodern uncertainties (Nussbaum 2013, 631). 
We hardly need to point out to our readers that all but one of the contributors 
to this collection are women. This was not a deliberate strategy but it is perhaps an 
indication of the extent to which women’s voices are becoming stronger within the 
academy. A growing body of feminist theatre historians including Jacky Bratton, 
Maggie Gale, Viv Gardner, Kate Newey, and Gilli Bush-Bailey have succeeded in 
research which has ranged over historical periods and genres to recover the lives and 
creativity of neglected or actually forgotten women theatre-makers. But as Susan 
Bennett has recently argued, this work remains ‘collectively marginal, still in the 
shadow of theatre history’s customary archives’. It is necessary in her view ‘to think 
about the laws of theatre history and what accounts for value in its archive’ (Bennett 
2010, 65-6, original emphasis). Is there an alternative archive; another ‘body’ of 
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evidence which could suggest other ‘laws’ of historical writing? This possibility is 
explored in Diana Taylor’s 2003 The Archive and the Repertoire, an important 
intervention in theatre studies which asks ‘how can we think about performance in 
historical terms, when the archive cannot capture and store the live event?’ (Taylor 
2003, xvi). Her concept of ‘scenarios …as culturally specific imaginaries’ (13) is 
taken up in different ways by Viv Gardner, Heike Roms and Alison Jeffers in this 
collection as each broaden the way we can view and conceptualise performance. 
However, feminist epistemology and feminist ethics as branches of 
philosophical thinking which began to emerge in the 1980s have offered the 
possibility of a different way of thinking through ethical dilemmas which may also 
have wider implications for the study of both theatre as it is traditionally defined, and 
of performance in more fluid models of cultural practice. Feminist philosopher Helen 
Longino’s introduction to feminist epistemology demonstrates the extent to which the 
new discourse had begun to radically inform disciplines as various as the natural 
sciences, sociology, political science and educational psychology by the late 1990s. 
She tackles head on the suggestion that ‘a feminist epistemology is oxymoronic’: that 
‘epistemology is a highly general inquiry — into the meaning of knowledge claims 
and attributions, into conditions for the possibility of knowledge’, while ‘feminism is 
a family of positions and inquiries characterised by some common socio-political 
interests’. Instead, she argues, given that ‘traditional academic disciplines have rested 
on philosophical presuppositions that may be implicated in sexist or androcentric 
outcomes […] Feminist epistemology is a necessity’ (Longino 1999, 327). As James 
Rachels points out, ‘the “male way of thinking” — the appeal to impersonal principles 
— has dismissed alleged “diffusion and confusion of judgement” in women’s 
thinking’ (Rachels 2003, 164). Longino draws on the work of biologist Evelyn Keller 
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which shows the impact of a belief in a ‘master molecule’ and the ‘triple conjuncture 
of ideologies of masculinity, control over nature, and scientific knowledge’ and the 
extent to which ‘our cognitive orientation is affectively inflected’ (Longino 1999, 
328). 
  The publication in 1982 of the seminal In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development by the psychologist Carol Gilligan introduced the 
concept of the ethics of care, derived from women’s traditionally-assigned role in 
caring and nurture which is seen as evidence of women’s moral strength, an 
overriding concern with relationships and responsibilities. Surveying the work of 
feminist philosophers who were influenced by Gilligan, Russ Shafer-Landau points 
out that there is no one simple formula that can express the core of care ethics (2013, 
689) and for him (pace Longino et al) the suggestion that men and women think 
differently needs to be treated with great caution. But this relatively new perspective 
calls into question the way women’s moral authority has been traditionally 
subordinated to that of men’s and thus foregrounds the legitimacy of an alternative to 
the dominance of rule-based ethics. This, as Kate Newey argues in Chapter 5 of this 
volume, ‘Feminist Historiography and Ethics: A Case Study from Victorian Britain’, 
‘challenges monolithic views of the self, investigating the ways in which subjectivity 
is formed through discursive and material practices, proposing interdependence and 
interrelationship as the foundations for an ethical or moral world view’. 
A fundamental question which has to be asked in relation to the practical 
application of ethical theory to human conduct is the point at which ‘ought’ becomes 
‘must’. This has been considered by the contemporary educationalist and philosopher 
Nel Noddings, a leading exponent of feminist ethics. Noddings acknowledges that 
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Immanuel Kant’s identification of the ethical as that which is done out of duty rather 
than love seems right. But she continues: 
an ethic built on caring strives to maintain the caring attitude and is thus 
dependent upon, and not superior to, natural caring.The source of ethical 
behaviour is, then, in twin sentiments — one that feels directly for the other 
and one that feels for and with that best self, who may accept and sustain the 
initial feeling rather than reject it (Noddings  2003, 80). 
Natural caring — the model for Noddings is the care of a mother for her child — 
requires, in her view, no ethical effort: ‘want and ought’ are indistinguishable. But 
there comes a point when what the individual initially wants to do becomes ‘ought’ to 
do and then finally ‘must’ do. In service of what Noddings calls ‘one-caring’, ‘I must’ 
becomes an imperative ‘in response to the plight of the other and our conflicting 
desire to serve our own interests’ (79-80). 
More recently in The Ethics of Care and Empathy the ethicist Michael Slote 
has built on the work of both Gilligan and Noddings to shift care ethics away from 
what could at worst, be  marginalised as an anti-feminist, status quo-preserving 
stance, or simply treated as a complement to traditional, patriarchal ethical thinking 
(2007, 2). For Slote empathy (as opposed to sympathy), ‘involves having the feelings 
of another (involuntarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in 
pain. It is as if their pain invades us’ (2007, 13, original parenthesis). Slote argues 
‘that empathy and the notion of empathic caring for or about others offer us a 
plausible criterion of moral evaluation’ (16) and indeed that an ethic of caring can 
work for the whole of ethics or morality’. Gilligan’s insistence on ‘a new way of 
thinking that begins with the premise that we live not in separation but in relationship’ 
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(1993, xxvi) becomes fundamental in Slote’s reading to an ethics which transcends 
gender boundaries. 
Empathy as a concept however is a slippery term. As a historian in pursuit of 
truth Mary Furlong also values empathy but as ‘a neutral tool’. Furlong sees 
empathetic capacity as a means ‘to try “to get inside” the mentalities of key 
protagonists in the historical situation’. But unlike sympathy, empathy is not 
necessarily predicated on personal identification and positive understanding. Instead, 
deploying Max Weber’s concept, the tool of empathy produces ‘interpretive 
understanding’ (Fulbrook 2002, 167). 
 
History and Memory 
At the beginning of this Introduction we referred to ‘the unreliability of memory’, a 
perhaps self-evident truth that is nonetheless key to many of the explorations of both 
evidence and historiographic ethics in this volume. In his Modern Historiography: An 
Introduction the historian Michael Bentley tackles ‘the difficulty’ of memory and the 
errors and imagined witnessing of events which are the product of ‘the claim of 
memory to provide a direct link with the past or a pulling of it forward into the 
present’ (1998, 155), citing the work on memory as a social construct which began 
with Maurice Halbwachs and Frederick Bartlett in the 1920s and 30s. History, 
Bentley states, ‘is precisely non-memory, a systematic discipline which seeks to rely 
on mechanisms and controls quite different from those which memory triggers and 
often intended to give memory the lie’ (1998, 155). But equally he acknowledges the 
importance of oral history, and thus of individual memory, in recovering the other 
histories: the ‘subaltern’, the experience of the deeply traumatised which has evaded 
formal documentation, and lives within cultures where literacy has either not been 
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universally established or prioritised (Bentley, 1999 155-6). In their essays in this 
volume, both Heike Roms and Claire Cochrane encounter the ‘the difficulty’ in 
different ways: Cochrane in discussing conflicted and conflicting memories of past 
lived experience in her exploration of the endogenous and exogenous forces 
surrounding the failure of the Nia Centre (Chapter 7) and Roms in her essay, ‘Mind 
the Gaps: Evidencing Performance and Performing Evidence in Performance Art 
History’ where she considers the performative necessity of orally-communicated 
memory of consciously ephemeral performance practice (Chapter 9). Roms’ approach 
highlights the role of performativity and creativity both in the creation of memory and 
in its utilisation by historians which Geoffrey Cubitt suggests necessarily reflects its 
ability ‘to synthesize, to generalize, to prioritize, to select’: 
Such an approach encourages us — historians included — to view memory’s 
instances of ‘unreliability’ less as simple manifestations of defectiveness than 
as part of the more general — and always both necessary and problematic — 
process by which the mind creatively and pragmatically interprets and engages 
with its stream of experience. It encourages historians to move beyond a 
simple methodological concern with gauging the accuracy of specific 
recollections, and to develop techniques that are geared instead to 
comprehending the place which ‘erroneous’ details occupies in larger patterns 
of recollection, and to exploring the meaning that memories of past 
experience, including ‘distorted’ ones, may embody or articulate (Cubitt 2007, 
84-5). 
However frail or disputed the memory, the imperative to retain collective memory —
the moral injunction never to forget — lies at the heart of Wyschogrod’s ‘ardour’ and 
is arguably in the most extreme examples of past suffering, the reason why the dead 
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must be honoured. As we hope we have shown in our discussion thus far, the traces 
left by the irretrievable dead, continue to shape both our present and future. Allan 
Megill, in his response to Wyschogrod insists that ‘When we remember, what we 
remember has to be something that continues to live within our situations now — 
something that we believe comes to us from the past, and may well do so, but whose 
primary connection is to our present (2004, 49, original emphasis). Such an approach 
is at the heart of the ‘social archiving’ project discussed by Alison Jeffers in Chapter 
8, where her exploration of what she terms ‘collecting’ and ‘re-collecting’ of memory 
shows that however fragmented and distorted, memory functions in post-conflict 
Northern Ireland as a reality of the past inextricably locked into the present. 
 
 The Essays 
The essays included in this volume, brought together to reflect the diversity of current 
scholarship in theatre history and historiography, range in focus from the different 
challenges represented by the more or less traditional task of writing a canonical actor 
biography as opposed to constructing, as micro-history, the performative life of a 
wilful social outsider; an interrogation of the evidential basis for the anti-theatrical 
prejudice in nineteenth-century America; Victorian women theatre practitioners 
whose presence in English theatre history has been occluded; amateur garrison theatre 
in nineteenth-century colonial India, performative strategies for exploring the history 
of Welsh performance art from the 1960s and 70s, late-twentieth-century black British 
theatre and an applied theatre project in a ‘post-conflict’ Belfast community. All 
contributors, as individual historians and historiographers, question dominant 
narratives of theatre history. Some take on the responsibility of representing the 
histories of the living, while some show the way definitions of models of theatre and 
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performance have broadened significantly in recent years. All grapple with the ethical 
issues raised by the concrete demands of specific histories. All are trying to tell the 
truth but in the full consciousness of the conditions and constraints which that 
imposes, balancing an ethics of truth with an ethics of care and responsibility towards 
their different subjects.  
As will become clear, ‘conditions’ vary a great deal for the individual 
historians who have contributed to this volume. A key ‘condition’ — where the word 
means ‘ a stipulation; something upon the fulfilment of which something else 
depends’ — for the historian who wishes to uncover new truths or challenge 
previously accepted old truths about well-known histories is that the probity of the 
new evidence is shown to be as reliable as possible, as the three essays in Part I, ‘Re-
writing (Master) Narratives’, explore. As we have already noted, for the starting point 
of his essay reflecting on his approach to writing a biography of the great Restoration 
actor Thomas Betterton, David Roberts takes up the invitation offered by the Greek 
origin of the word ‘ethics’ as ‘matters of character’. In discussing the ‘character’ of 
his inquiry into the ‘character’ of an actor best known through the ‘characters’ he 
played on stage, Roberts acknowledges the need to embrace his subject as ‘Other’, 
while at the same time achieving ‘a reconciliation of sympathy and judgment’. 
Careful scrutiny of assumptions built on old evidence; the discovery, in a moment of 
pure positivist serendipity, of previously unknown evidence; extrapolation from 
surviving evidence of the fuller life lived outside the theatre — all exemplify 
methodologies deployed by the good historian. Roberts takes these further, however, 
in taking up Derrida’s concept of ‘circumfession’, the ‘narration of self through 
networks of friends and associates’ which enables a positioning of the biographical 
subject ‘amid a system of multiple ‘others’. 
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Those ‘others’ also include other historians whose conclusions must be 
challenged to make way for new readings and new or additional truths. Both Roberts, 
and Rosemarie Bank whose essay focuses on influential assumptions about the 
dominance of the anti-theatrical prejudice in nineteenth-century theatre in the United 
States of America, engage with the other scholarly authorities who have constructed 
master narratives. Like Roberts, Banks looks for ‘explanations of behaviour’ which 
arise from the material circumstances — social and economic forces and institutional 
pressures. She does not deny the existence of the anti-theatrical prejudice as a real 
historical position, but argues that as a ‘bad faith’ historiographical position it 
‘reduces a construct of some complexity (prejudice) to a binary discourse foreclosing 
complex, ethically-inflected analysis’. Her emphasis on the need for historians to 
eschew 'bias' grounded in inadequate scrutiny of evidential sources is a reminder of 
the importance of ‘epistemic virtue’ for the maintenance of ethical scholarship.  
In the final essay of Part I, Viv Gardner recognises the challenges and 
temptations for the historian in constructing her own master narrative, utilising 
different registers of writing to comment on, question and undermine the apparent 
certainties in her understanding of the life of her subject, the 5th Marquis of Anglesey 
and to make transparent her own role as academic, researcher and writer in the 
construction of her history. As with other writers in this volume, Gardner draws on 
the work of Diana Taylor in The Archive and the Repertoire (2003). Taylor’s political 
commitment to Latin American performance studies led her to consider the 
exclusionary consequences of archives consisting of written documents. If 
performance itself ‘did not transmit knowledge, only the literate and powerful could 
claim social memory and identity’ (Taylor 2003, xvii ). Offering an exemplary case 
study for the micro-historiographer through a re-examination of her research into the 
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bizarre performance career of her subject, Gardner quotes Taylor on the concept of 
scenario and imaginaries in the retrieval of evidence: ‘we could […] look to scenarios 
as meaning-making paradigms that structure social environments, behaviours, and 
potential outcomes […] the scenario makes visible […] what is already there: the 
ghosts, the images, the stereotypes’ (Taylor 2003, 28). In committing to a 
historiographic process which is ‘fluid, elusive and multi-layered’, Gardner aims to 
pursue not so much truth as ‘reliability’ and ‘trust’. Indeed in deploying what Gardner 
calls ‘an empathetic understanding of the complexity of the performance event’, she 
echoes Fulbrook’s argument, highlighted earlier, that the historian should use 
empathy ‘to try to “get inside” the mentalities of the key protagonists in the historical 
situation’ (Fulbrook 2002, 167). 
In the first of the essays in Part II, ‘“Other” Histories’, Kate Newey also 
grapples with a more personal threat of ‘bad faith’ as she considers the lives of three 
Victorian women — Florence Bell, Aimèe Beringer, and Constance Beerbohm — the 
evidence of whose lives as writers, theatre practioners and active members of theatre 
networks and families is to be found largely in the archives of others. While 
acknowledging the important work of second-wave feminism in uncovering and 
championing the work of neglected or forgotten female writers, Newey raises a 
specific historiographical question as to the position of the researcher when, as we 
have identified in our earlier discussion of Rüsen, there are differences in the 
normative horizon and value system of past and present. Through her consideration of 
the lives of these three women, Newey asks ‘how, as a feminist historian, I should 
deal with women whose views and actions offer challenges to contemporary (twenty-
first century) feminist critical positions’. As a feminist historian, considering the lives 
and work of these conservative women, who eschewed overt feminism, she has to 
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find a way of resisting the tendency of feminist scholars to ‘explain’ views which do 
not align easily with a critique of patriarchy. As Newey puts it, an alternative 
framework — developed through a recognition of the ethic of care — can open out 
feminist enquiries into the lives of women, enabling the researcher to understand and 
interpret the negotiations of individuals with the constraints of the social structures 
within which they live. If we agree with Thiroux that ‘most ethical systems meet in 
the social aspect’ then the preoccupation with ‘human actions in relational and 
embodied contexts’ as a means of engagement with the central ethical questions of the 
historian’s responsibility is shared by all the contributors to this collection. 
Such relational and embodied contexts raise particular challenges for both 
Poonam Trivedi and Claire Cochrane, whose essays make up the remainder of Part II 
of this volume. Both tackle the historiographical challenges of writing the history of 
the Other from a perspective of difference of both race and time. Levinas’s Other is, 
as we have argued earlier in this Introduction, a primordial imperative. The term, 
however, has now become commonplace as a way of defining the subordinate, the 
marginalised or simply forgotten and as such makes more concrete ethical claims on 
the practical function of the historian. Edward Said’s incorporation of the concept of 
the Other into his theory of Orientalism, which frames the way the subaltern colonised 
is ‘known’ and understood through the dominance of European supremacist 
ideologies, is helpful for the way the Empire now ‘writes back’ in a re-examination of 
the events and sites of the relatively distant colonial past (Said 1978). Trivedi’s essay, 
‘Garrison Theatre in Colonial India: Issues of Valuation’, thus considers more broadly 
the way that Indian postcolonial historiography has to face the challenge of 
confronting the transformative impact of Western cultural practice. As Trivedi 
acknowledges, Indian theatre has not been ‘innocent’ in the history of power. For her 
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the central ethical task which arises from her discussion of a series of archives which 
enable the tracing of the English army’s impact on the theatrical and performance 
culture of India is whether the recovery of this evidence can and should be read 
beyond nostalgia, or even comprador complicity, to reconfigure theatrical history in 
terms of the politics of location and representation, and the reversal of subject 
positions. 
Trivedi’s use of archival material itself raises historiographic and ethical 
challenges. Despite the influence of Taylor’s concept of the repertoire as a ‘non-
archival system of transfer’ (2003, xvii) made up of embodied practices and 
knowledge which runs through several of the chapters in this volume, archives in the 
traditional sense, remain the repository of much of the primary research materials 
utilised by the historian. In ‘Archive Fever’ Derrida, tracing the term back to the 
Greek arkheson or ‘house of command’ established and controlled by the archons or 
citizens who held and signified political power, puts forward a view of archives which 
sees them as constructs of power (Derrida 1995). Selection, preservation, disposal and 
rights of access are in the hands of the archivists assuming authority over the 
researcher. State repositories, of course, do not only hold documents directly relating 
to domestic ‘home’ interests, but may also contain materials appropriated from other 
weaker subaltern sources and as such represent colonial power: Trivedi confronts the 
all too physical conditions and constraints of such appropriations in her essay on 
garrison theatre in colonial India. Her research has necessitated travel outside India to 
the British Library in London to consult the Cuppage and Wonnacott collections of 
papers which offer evidence of the way the British army, alongside its primary 
function of maintaining imperial control over the sub-continent, developed a system 
of amateur dramatic clubs (ADCs). Not only did this provide a means of self-
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aggrandisement and possible career progression for British army officers, it also had a 
significant impact on the theatrical and performance culture of the elite indigenous 
population privileged to witness the entertainment. In addition to the ideological and 
ethical questions that this raises for the post-colonial historian, Trivedi also points to 
the continuing metropolitan control of these archival materials and their consequent 
invisibility from the Indian intellectual sphere.  
Problems of access to — or indeed the lack of existence of — archives also 
confront Claire Cochrane in her essay on the failure of the Nia Centre for African and 
Caribbean Culture, established in 1991 as the UK’s first black-led arts centre. One of 
the greatest challenges posed by the recent past lies in the investigation of the agents 
involved in organisations and administrative or enabling structures where both 
success and failure can, in part, be attributed to personal agency. In theatre the 
collapse of institutions — be they theatre companies, buildings or revenue sources — 
almost invariably result in considerable and wide-ranging individual unhappiness in 
terms of failed hopes, shattered dreams, collapse of livelihood and actual suffering. 
Probing the reasons for these failures throws up the conflicts of interests and values 
within the social context. Historians have to accept that in Wyschogrod’s words the 
‘past is irrecoverable in its vivacity’ (2004, 30), but there is a growing problem that 
even the documentary remains which record the thoughts and words which shaped 
that past are shielded from view to protect the interests of the living, however 
culpable: the 2000 Freedom of Information Act contains exemptions for ‘personal 
data, particularly sensitive personal data relating to racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious beliefs, membership of a trade union, physical or mental health, 
sexual life, (alleged) commission of any offence, court proceedings for any (alleged) 
offence)’, while the Data Protection Act 1998 stipulates that data must not be used ‘in 
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such a way that substantial damage or distress is, or is likely to be, caused to any data 
subject or any other person’. An important aspect of Claire Cochrane’s essay, focused 
on the historic failure to develop and nurture resources for Black British and British 
Asian theatre-makers, is concerned with the witness silences and archival empty 
spaces which might offer some insight into the contributory structural weaknesses and 
unexamined assumptions . 
While Trivedi highlights the perhaps unexpected consequences of Western 
imperialism abroad, Cochrane explores more negative consequences that are still 
evident in the lives of twenty-first century diasporic communities, arguing that post-
colonial analysis must also be deployed in the historical investigation of the ethically 
compromised and fractured relationships which have characterised attempts to make 
‘the good at which all things aim’ available to all members of the British theatre-
making community. These include those who have been officially classified as other, 
that is, as ‘minority ethnic’. As noted earlier in this introduction, Aristotle’s society 
had a highly structured system of ‘othering’ which subordinated women and the 
enslaved subaltern. It has also now been acknowledged that Western philosophy itself 
has until comparatively recently tended to adopt an intellectually superior position in 
relation to non-Western traditions such as Chinese theories of moral self-cultivation 
which can be traced back to the eleventh century BCE (Thiroux 2007, 10-11). 
As Cochrane points out in her essay, recent discussion of the social and ethical 
dimensions of racial classification has highlighted disagreement between the ‘short-
term eliminativists’ who recognising (put bluntly) that there is no such thing as race, 
wish to put a speedy end to racial categories; and ‘the long-term conservationists’ that 
consider there is some benefit to retaining racial identities and communities. This 
debate surfaces in contemporary theatre in relation to the initiatives which enable 
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‘stories of our own value’ to be told both within and outside communities of 
difference. In the socially and politically fraught arena of race relations, conduct-
controlling rules based on a universalist categorical imperative are deemed essential 
for justice and equality. But probing deeper into the ethical implications of what is 
known as ‘implicit and explicit racial bias’ (Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2012) reveals 
more complex dilemmas which are addressed in Cochrane’s essay. 
Like Gardner, Heike Roms and Alison Jeffers both reference the influence of 
Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the Repertoire in the essays that make up the final 
part of this volume, ‘The Ethics of Evidence’ and which voice a particular concern 
with memory and performance as both tools and evidentiary sources for the historian.   
Alison Jeffers’ essay, ‘Collecting And Re-Collecting: the Challenges and Possibilities 
of Developing a Social Archive in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland’, explores the 
potential of embodied memory in her discussion of a ‘social archiving’ process 
designed to bring healing to a damaged community, in which interpretive 
understanding based on a commitment to reliability and trust takes on a very specific 
ethical urgency. Jeffers’ essay focuses on a project set up in the Mount Vernon 
housing estate in Belfast where the predominantly Protestant community is far from 
reconciled to the outcomes of the Northern Irish peace agreement. As a historian of 
theatre as ‘telling stories’ at a grass roots community level, she is observing theatre 
practitioners ‘making history’ out of the memories of participants. While this activity 
without doubt corresponds to Rüsen’s three levels of historical responsibility, Jeffers 
also introduces Paul Ricoeur’s thinking on the three constituent parts of the 
relationship between history and memory as a framework for her discussion (Ricoeur 
2004).  
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The artefact at the centre of the Mount Vernon project, the crudely threatening 
‘Prepared for Peace/ Ready for War’ mural, functions in Jeffers’ analysis as what the 
French historian Pierre Nora terms a ‘lieu de memoire’, a place of memory, in which a 
residual sense of continuity remains (Nora 1996). As a historical ‘trace’, the mural 
contributes to the embodied, on-going process of social archiving. The issue of how 
far this sensitive, inward-looking, recuperative activity can move out to the social 
arena to achieve what Ricouer considers the ethico-political ‘duty to tell’ raises 
further questions about the ethical use of evidence derived from individual memory 
and what kind of ‘archive’ results. Rather than a ‘house of records’, and thus 
potentially an instrument of state control as Derrida conceived it, could it, Jeffers 
suggests, become ‘a community of records’ developed through a Taylor-style 
repertoire of acts of embodied memory? 
The volume concludes with an essay by Heike Roms, whose recent research 
— What’s Welsh for performance? Locating the Early History of Performance Art — 
concerns the history of performance art in Wales in the 1960s and 70s. Roms’ 
archival research for that project has been supplemented by a series of alternative, 
creative performance formats — which she terms ‘historio-dramaturgical’ — 
including re-enactments of past performances and staged oral history conversations. 
Through a consideration of such performative strategies, Roms concludes that all 
evidence is itself is both performative and collaborative in nature, ‘always the product 
of a scholarly performance, and not its pre-existing object of attention’. In her 
discussion of what she argues are the twofold ethical implications of recognising and 
acknowledging that necessary performativity and collaboration in researching and 
recording performance histories, Roms introduces to an English speaking readership 
the work of Sybille Peters. For Peters, according to Roms, evidence is not a thing (a 
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document or other material trace) used as a form of proof for performance, nor an 
ephemeral act of performance used as evidence; rather, evidence is itself a 
performative event. Thus, Roms argues, to recognize the performative quality of 
evidence means to acknowledge the presence or participation of others in its 
performance. It also calls attention to the key role played by the representational 
strategies employed in that performance and the ethical importance of making such 
strategies visible and transparent within the evidence event, reminding its audiences 
or recipients that history itself is a complex negotiation of past and present. 
 The conclusion of Roms essay, then, brings us back to the starting point of this 
Introduction, where we argued for the importance of both understanding the 
constructedness of the theatre and performance histories that we research and write 
and for making that constructedness visible to our readers. The gap between past and 
present - and the values and priorities of both times - may indeed be unbridgeable, but 
we would argue here that an ethically aware scholarship articulates the pressures of 
both past and present in its exploration of such histories, and seeks to develop 
appropriate historiographic methods for doing so. In introducing the essays in this 
volume, we are very conscious that these reflections on ethically-aware scholarship in 
theatre history are only a starting point. Others, we hope, will pick up where we have 
left off and in particular extend the conversation to include other approaches and 
models of theatre practice; in doing so, the call in the essays collected here to reflect 
on both the evidence and the ethics of theatre and performance history will prove a 
useful spur to a reflective and questioning historiographic process.  
 
                                                 
i Aragay references Grehan 2009; Meyer-Dinkgräfe and Watt 2010 and Matthews and Torevell 2011. 
She also highlights the establishment of Performing Ethos: An International Journal of Ethics and 
Performance, in 2011. 
